Ireland is rare among advanced economies in not having statutory trade union recognition legislation for collective bargaining purposes. The matter has been a source of policy contention over the years with attempts to resolve it encapsulated in the so-called 'Right to Bargain' legislation, introduced in 2001. This legislation has sought to circumvent statutory recognition in Ireland by putting in place an alternative mechanism for unions to represent members in non-union firms where collective bargaining is not practiced. This review, based on a mixture of empirical and documentary evidence, demonstrates that IRAA 2001-4 was moderately successful for a short period in generating pay rises, improved employment conditions and better access to procedures for union members in non-unionised firms. Indeed, in some respects, it was a superior institutional mechanism to a statutory recognition regime.
Introduction
In liberal-market economies (LMEs) Industrial Relations Act 1969 (IRA 1969) and, much less frequently, the Industrial Relations Act 1990 (IRA 1990) . However if the Court found in favour of recognition, which it routinely did, the employer was under no legal obligation to consent. Studies suggest that from the 1980s onwards, there was a growing tendency for employers to simply flout Court recommendations on this matter 5 . This proved progressively challenging for unions, especially as their power resources at local-level waned over time and the decline in unions'
industrial strength dispossessed them of sufficient bargaining power to put recognition claims into effect. The 1980s and 1990s saw the organisational base of private sector unions steadily corrode, first through the impact of high unemployment, but more substantively, through structural changes in the economy. New fields of employment proved inhospitable for union growth 6 . Since the 1980s, non-union multinational companies, particularly of US ownership, have been relatively successful in instigating union-free industrial relations. The policy stance of government and its industrial development agencies also shifted from encouraging firms to recognise unions to one of being accommodative to non-union multinationals 7 Table 8 below).
Data collection in the 15 cases relied on face-to-face interviews, usually of one hour duration. The first data source was the company chief executive who either owned or headed the firms participating in the case studies. Interviews were also conducted with full-time trade union organisers responsible for the individual dispute, and documentary analysis was collated of specific employer responses to the recognition request. Whilst the enquiry sought to interview the relevant union officials for all fifteen firms, this proved impossible and union officials were found to be frequently either un-contactable and/or unwilling to participate.
Eight union organisers, representing workers involved in twelve disputes, were interviewed.
Interviews covered the origins, practice and outcomes of disputes. Background interviews were also conducted with representatives from the ICTU, IBEC, LRC and Labour Court. A limitation of the case studies is lack of information about union members within each firm, a problem resulting from issues of access and confidentiality. While confinement of case selection to availability of access is less than ideal, the reliance on access for selection is reasonable where an enquiry seeks to study what can often be difficult to reach or contentious types of cases 26 . Our own analysis, and interviews with union officials, tends to indicate that the actions of included case firms were broadly typical of employer behaviour in disputes processed under the procedures. 'completed' being inclusive of cases where all issues were resolved at the LRC, where issues were referred to the Labour Court or where collective bargaining was negotiated. Only 25 of these had all issues resolved at LRC level with 60 cases being referred to the Labour Court.
Background on IRAA 2001-4 disputes
In just six cases was collective bargaining negotiated. Further interviews with the LRC suggest that patterns reported in this period are representative of year on year trends.
However despite the high number of cases referred by the LRC, the number of cases addressed by the Labour Court remains smaller. In terms of deployment (see Table 5 ), IRAA 2001-4 was used mostly in the indigenous services sector (close to two-thirds of cases). Retail, security, hoteliers, transport, crèches, nursing homes and waste-management firms were typical targets. These were characterised by one union official as "low hanging fruit". In manufacturing, the pharmaceutical/medical devices sector, packaging, and industries supplying to the then booming Irish construction industry were targeted. In terms of ownership, close to 80 percent of firms subject to IRAA 2001-4 were Irish-owned, with a minority from the US, Europe and UK respectively. An even spread of small-to medium-sized enterprises (measured by number of employees) were subject to IRAA 2001-4, with large firms in the minority. There are a lower number of employers relative to the overall number of recommendations and determinations as some employers could be subject to more than one recommendation and/or a recommendation and determination.
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In terms of outcomes across the 15 cases, the opening employer response to union requests to enter negotiations was typically met by a refusal to engage at workplace level.
Union requests to discuss issues at local-level were either ignored by employers or met with responses that direct relations with individual employees were favoured (see Table 9 ). In eight cases, employers called, what union officials termed, "captured audience meetings"
outlining their disappointment and hostility that unions were attempting to organise the workplace. Just one employer met with the union, but notwithstanding this, no agreement could be secured. The lack of progress at workplace level led to cases being brought by unions to the LRC. Yet efforts by the LRC to encourage voluntary resolution were largely fruitless. In some instances, employers did not appear at the LRC, responding to invites by claiming union unrepresentativeness or that disputed issues were being, or had been, addressed internally. One employer, for instance, refused to entertain an LRC meeting on the grounds that it would provide "de facto recognition" of the union's legitimacy and dent the company's "principled position of non-unionism" (Employer, WasteCo). However some employers were more receptive to LRC invitations, attending on the grounds that "it was worth exploring the substance of the union's claim, but in an environment where we wouldn't directly enter negotiations with them, but explore it through the [LRC] Advisory people" (Employer, DrinksCo). In these cases, employers declared inability to pay union requests for wage increases, but nonetheless indicated some readiness to resolve disputed issues. In only three cases was substantial progress made on resolving issues in dispute.
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Of the 15 disputes, no full resolutions of disputes were secured at the voluntarist LRC stage, resulting in cases being advanced to the Labour Court. In general, employers attended the Labour Court hearing given the potential for a recommendation (and subsequent determination) being issued against them (see Table 10 ). As one employer put it:
The advice we received was that Court intervention might have legal implications for the company down the line and affect our ability to match terms and conditions with the market. So naturally, we felt compelled to attend and defend our position.
(Employer, GlassCo)
However a characteristic approach was to undermine the legitimacy of the union claim or create obstacles to Labour Court intervention. For example, one employer argued that the Court hearing was "illegitimate", claiming the union had none of the company's employees in membership (Employer, CementCo). The union offered the Court a list of members on a confidential basis, suggesting that employees feared hostility from the company if membership was known. The union cited separate instances of union victimisation.
CementCo solicitors objected to this, arguing that their client was entitled, on the grounds of natural justice and fair procedure, to comment on material placed before the Court. On this basis, the solicitors argued, the case should be dropped. The Court refused to receive such information from the union, but, crucially, observed that the IRAA 2001-4 did not require a minimum number of members to process a case and accepted union assurances that it was representative of employees.
Other employers were less hostile and partial compromise was offered. In the PlasticsCo case, the employer stated that whilst it would not recognise the union for collective bargaining purposes, it would meet some union requests (in this case, improved sick pay). At GlassCo, agreement was reached with the union on fixed pay scales and a sick pay scheme, along with assurances on a pension scheme. Nonetheless unions did suffer occasional defeat.
In the PetrolCo case, the Court found that the employer paid workers the going rate for the sector and that the union pay claim was invalid (the union could not prove pay rates were out of line). In the WasteCo dispute, the employer successfully argued that pay exceeded sectoral norms, citing Central Statistics Office (CSO) earnings surveys in support. Similar outcomes were replicated at EngineeringCo and TelecomCo, although in the former the employer was advised to establish procedures allowing union representation on individual matters. 
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Unsurprisingly, some employers displayed hostility towards the Labour Court in light of their experience under IRAA 2001-4. Court influence was an "infringement on the rights of business" (DrinksCo), diluted with "anti-business sentiment" (PackagingCo), "biased towards union style industrial relations" (SupplyCo) or even "totalitarian" in its provisions (PlasticsCo). Of particular concern amongst those employers subject to IRAA 2001-4 was the lack of criteria for union representativeness and subsequent 'ease' at which the union could secure a Court hearing. Many saw this as providing "a blank cheque for the unions"
(CementCo), allowing unions to bring changes in the firm's employment conditions without having to demonstrate the extent of their support:
When they were asked how many production operatives they have (in membership), they said 'we have eighty'. Now that can't be true because we don't even have that many operatives in the first place.
(Employer, PharmaCo)
In the aftermath of Labour Court recommendations, different outcomes emerged (Table   12 ), indicating that transposition of recommendations could be problematic. Only 3 out of 15 firms fully implemented initial recommendations -DrinksCo, GlassCo and PlasticsCo. None In MedicalCo, TabletCo and WasteCo, the union had to bring at least two other claims on dispute issues for further recommendations under IRAA 2001-4. Such repeat campaigns however tended to undermine support amongst employees as it signalled that the employer would be unlikely to concede union recognition:
Management, from the first to the last, they said they would never deal with a union. And they're a company who deal with unions all over the world, but they said 'we will never deal with a union in Ireland'. For a lot of people, if they had the chance to vote us in, they would have voted us in 9 to 1, but for a lot of people it was 'why join, it's going nowhere, they'll never deal with us'. (Union Organiser, TabletCo)
Problematically for unions, officials often reported difficulties in retaining members in cases where no Labour Court support for claims was forthcoming as it generated perceptions that union membership was of little efficacy.
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Employer investigate the case, it should consider the dispute through gathered evidence, referring to lack of sufficient union membership evidence.
Subsequent to the Supreme Court judgement, two of the case study employers attempted to exploit the ruling. As the employer PharmaCo acknowledged:
The Supreme Court ruling crystallised all of our concerns about the Act. It opened the space for us to challenge the legality of what the Labour Court was imposing.
At the Supreme Court, PharmaCo registered an appeal against the Labour Court determination, claiming that the Labour Court was 'misdirected' in determining the existence of a dispute by accepting "unsubstantiated assertions" from the union. In retort, the union balloted for industrial action, but refrained from strike action when the employer evinced a desire to resolve matters at workplace level. An agreement on pay and conditions was drawn up, made without reference to the Labour Court determination, but providing for a similar outcome. At the same time, the employer instituted an internal employee forum to act as a 'collective bargaining' body. In the PackagingCo case, when the union sought a Labour
Court determination in early 2007 the employer claimed the hearing was invalid as it already engaged in collective bargaining through a 'Employee Representative Council', and raised several issues relating to verification of union members, use of internal procedures and existence of a 'trade dispute'. However, the Court noted that at the original recommendation hearing, the employer had raised no qualms on the existence of a dispute nor claimed to engage in collective bargaining. The Court subsequently issued a determination, which the employer later complied with.
As evident from Table 1 This is not to suggest that benefits all fell towards unions, employers also benefitted from this approach. The design of the procedures was such that it largely freed employers from direct union involvement so long as terms and conditions of employment were not out of line with sectoral norms. The Irish procedures could be regarded as providing more certain outcomes for employers, which might not necessarily be so under a statutory recognition regime. Of course, there were evident disadvantages in the procedures for both parties too. That IRAA 
